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CARLO PELLOSO (VERONA)
EPHESIS EIS TO DIKASTERION: 
REMARKS AND SPECULATIONS ON THE LEGAL 
NATURE OF THE SOLONIAN REFORM
Summary: 1) Introduction. - 2) The opinion considering the Solonian ἔφεσις a 
true appeal. - 3) The opinion considering the Solonian ἔφεσις a mandatory reference. 
- 4) The view that interprets the Solonian ἔφεσις as a remedy with negative effects. 
- 5) The basic information provided by the Aristotelian Constitution of the Athenians 
and by Plutarch. - 6) The ἀποδοκιμασία of the nine ἄρχοντες. - 7) Extraordinary and 
ordinary ἀποψηφίσεις. - 8) The arbitral γνῶσις. - 9) Some conclusions on the legal 
nature of the Solonian reform. - Bibliography.
1) Introduction. 
What is the origin of the Solonian procedural remedy called ἔφεσις εἰς τὸ 
δικαστήριον? What is its legal nature and its political impact? What are its conse-
quences under legal procedure, as well as under criminal, civil and administrative 
law (if I am allowed to make modern distinctions)? Both historians of political 
institutions and legal historians have proposed many different interpretations. The 
current communis opinio interprets the ἔφεσις εἰς τὸ δικαστήριον in terms of a ‘right 
of appeal’ and often repeats the views of earlier scholars, who analyzed the procedure 
at greater length.1
1  Cf., for instance, Todd (1994: 100, nt. 2); Welwei (1998: 154); Schubert (2000: 53); 
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In recent years, a few scholars have maintained – albeit with some doubts – 
that from its introduction at the beginning of the sixth century, ἔφεσις was the 
‘transfer’ of a case from the authority of a magistrate to the popular court rather 
than an ‘appeal’ to a court, which was instructed to retry a case already decided by 
the magistrate.2
2) The opinion considering the Solonian ἔφεσις a true appeal. 
According to the traditional and nowadays predominant view, the Solonian 
procedure ἔφεσις is viewed as an actual ‘appeal’ (even many who hold this view do 
not use this noun as a terminus technicus and therefore do not appreciate all the legal 
implications of their use of this term). Indeed, a true appeal produces a ‘suspensive 
effect’ (i.e. it interrupts the enforceability of a judgment given at first instance). It directly 
produces a ‘devolutive effect’ (i.e. it is the private remedy that, once filed by the aggrieved 
party, brings about the introduction of the case before a new judge). It is characterized 
by a ‘substitutive effect’ (i.e. it involves a second instance procedure ending with a new 
judgment that entirely replaces the first judgment)3.
3) The opinion considering the Solonian ἔφεσις a mandatory reference. 
According to a different explanation, one could define ἔφεσις, in strictly legal 
terms, as a ‘mandatory transfer’ of a case from any political body (at first a single 
magistrate, but also a board of citizens or other political body) to the popular judges. 
From a legal perspective, this idea implies the following consequences. Ἔφεσις is the 
act of an official or an act of a public officer or public board, rather than a private 
and discretionary act, which initiated an appellate review. Consequently, after the 
Solonian reform, the ἡλιαία would have passed judgments exclusively as a court of 
first instance, and it would have been the only (or the main) court empowered to give 
final judgments. As a result, magistrates – depending on the interpretation – would 
have lost practically all or, at least, much of their judicial power.4
Almeida (2003: 66); Mirhady (2006); Rhodes (2006: 255); Noussia-Fantuzzi (2010: 26-27); 
Leão - Rhodes (2015: 67-68).
2  Cf., in these terms, Gagarin (2006: 263-264).
3  Cf., among those who describe the Solonian reform in terms of a true appeal, Hudtwalker 
(1812); Tittmann (1822: 219); Thalheim (1905: 2773); Lipsius (1905-1915: 27-30, 230, 440); 
Busolt - Swoboda (1926: 851, 1151, 1457); Ralph (1936=1941); Bonner - Smith (1930-1938: 
1.231); Wade-Gery (1958: 192-195); Harrison (1971: 72-73); MacDowell (1978: 31); Rhodes 
(1981: 160-162); Ostwald (1986: 28, 12); Tamburini (1990). This view is mainly based on Ath. 
Pol. 9.1 and Plut. Sol. 18.2.
4  Cf., among those who describe the Solonian reform in terms of ‘transferal’, Schöll (1875: 
19, nt. 1); Pridik (1892: 111); Wilamowitz-Moellendorff (1893: 1.60); Ruschenbusch (1961); 
Ruschenbusch (1965); Hansen (1982: 37); Sealey (1983: 294-296); Hansen (1989: 260). This 
view considers the following testimonia unreliable because of strong influences played by 
Roman ideas: Plut. Sol. 18.2; Plut. Publ. 25.2; Poll. 8.62; Luc. Bis acc. 12.
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4) The view that interprets the Solonian ἔφεσις as a remedy with negative effects. 
A third view has received less attention in studies published in recent years.5 This 
view denies that one can characterize ἔφεσις as either a right of appeal or a transfer 
of jurisdiction. According to this view, ἔφεσις is a ‘claim’ submitted by the citizen 
who has suffered some bodily harm, monetary damages, or personal disadvantages 
from an ‘authoritative’ order issued by a magistrate. Yet, such a procedural remedy 
either would bear a resemblance to a private ‘veto’, that formally blocks the issuing 
of a final ruling, or it would turn out to be the ‘opposition to the enforcement of an 
authoritative act.’
It follows therefore that ἔφεσις produces only ‘negative effects’; either halting 
the enforceability of a decision coming from an official, a body, or a board different 
from the people, or preventing the validity – if not practically the existence – of 
such a decision. Moreover, if ἔφεσις basically removes any proposed judgment and 
award, as well as any administrative measure – on the level of either effects, or 
validity, or existence – the popular judges neither amend, nor quash, nor approve 
a previous ruling. In other words, the δικαστήριον substantially plays the role of a 
court of first instance before which the case, after an ἔφεσις is submitted, must or 
can be ex novo introduced (παλινδικία).6 In the present contribution, I will try to 
give some support to this neglected view.
5) The basic information provided by the Aristotelian ‘Constitution of the Athenians’ 
and by Plutarch.
Three important passages from the Aristotelian Constitution of the Athenians, 
together with some information from Plutarch’s Life of Solon,7 provide the following 
information.
Before ‘ἔφεσις to the popular court’ was introduced by Solon, ἀρχαί were both 
κύριοι (i.e. qualified to pass decisions that could not be amended or rescinded) and 
αὐτοτελεῖς (i.e. qualified to initiate ex officio legal procedures).8 In other words, in the 
5  Yet, see Loddo (2015), who gives a hybrid view of the Solonian remedy, as she keeps on 
labeling it as ‘appeal’ and yet, at the same time, adheres to the thesis qualifying it in terms of 
‘veto’. 
6  Cf. Steinwenter (1925=1971); Paoli (1950); Lepri (1960); Just (1965); Just (1968); Just 
(1970).
7  Ath. Pol. 9.1: τρίτον δὲ ᾧ καὶ μάλιστά φασιν ἰσχυκέναι τὸ πλῆθος, ἡ εἰς τὸ δικαστήριον 
ἔφεσις: κύριος γὰρ ὢν ὁ δῆμος τῆς ψήφου, κύριος γίγνεται τῆς πολιτείας; Ath. Pol. 3.5: κύριοι 
δ᾽ ἦσαν καὶ τὰς δίκας αὐτοτελεῖς κρίνειν, καὶ οὐχ ὥσπερ νῦν προανακρίνειν; Ath. Pol. 4.4: 
ἐξῆν δὲ τῷ ἀδικουμένῳ πρὸς τὴν τῶν Ἀρεοπαγιτῶν βουλὴν εἰσαγγέλλειν, ἀποφαίνοντι παρ᾽ 
ὃν ἀδικεῖται νόμον; Plut. Sol. 18.2: ὃ κατ᾽ ἀρχὰς μὲν οὐδέν, ὕστερον δὲ παμμέγεθες ἐφάνη: 
τὰ γὰρ πλεῖστα τῶν διαφόρων ἐνέπιπτεν εἰς τοὺς δικαστάς. καὶ γὰρ ὅσα ταῖς ἀρχαῖς ἔταξε 
κρίνειν, ὁμοίως καὶ περὶ ἐκείνων εἰς τὸ δικαστήριον ἐφέσεις ἔδωκε τοῖς βουλομένοις. See 
Harris (2006: 3-28), on the aims of Solon and the early Greek lawgivers. 
8  Cf., amplius, Pelloso (2014-2015).
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pre-Solonian legal system ἀρχαί were entitled to pass final judgments and to impose 
penalties on their own initiative (at least as far as the Greek perceptions of the fourth 
century on the Archaic age are concerned). If the magistrate enacted an ‘unjust’ judicial 
or administrative measure (for either procedural or substantive reasons), the citizen 
directly affected by the decision was only allowed to report it to the Areopagus (by 
filing – it is impossible to be more precise – a ‘reipersecutory’ claim or a penal one). The 
magisterial judgment was nevertheless final and directly enforceable.
Solon’s procedural reforms had an immediate effect on the legal nature of the 
magistrates’ acts, granting any Athenian citizen the right to have his case judged by 
a court of pairs. Indeed, any citizen – if dissatisfied by the magistrate’s decision – was 
allowed to submit ἔφεσις to obtain a trial in a popular court. Accordingly, on the one 
hand, ἔφεσις can be labeled as a voluntary procedural remedy available to any party. 
On the other hand, Solon seems to have just ‘strengthened’ an existing body, that 
is, the Athenian people as a judicial court (through the attribution of new functions 
and powers, as well as through its renewed composition).9 In Constitution of the 
Athenians Solon is said to have created a new procedure introduced by ‘ἔφεσις’ (rather 
than to have created the ‘popular court’ at the same time). Moreover, in Plutarch’s 
account, from Solon on, the popular court judged the majority of legal disputes (but 
not all of them), ‘even’ those included under the jurisdiction of magistrates (i.e. all 
those proceedings started before a magistrate, alongside other, although not better 
identified, disputes). 
Once the previous legal characteristics have been specified, one can go further, 
albeit cautiously. If one believes that the original Solonian remedy and its later 
applications shared the same and basic legal features, one can use this evidence to 
refine our interpretation of the data found in the Constitution of the Athenians and in 
Plutarch’s Life of Solon. Indeed, other testimonia from the Classical period about later 
periods of Athenian history reveal further features and essential characteristics of 
9  On the new (Solonian) composition of the previous (pre-Solonian) ἡλιαιία, cf. Plut. 
Sol. 18.2 (οἱ δὲ λοιποὶ πάντες ἐκαλοῦντο θῆτες, οἷς οὐδεμίαν ἄρχειν ἔδωκεν ἀρχήν, ἀλλὰ 
τῷ συνεκκλησιάζειν καὶ δικάζειν μόνον μετεῖχον τῆς πολιτείας); Ath. Pol. 7.3 (τοῖς δὲ τὸ 
θητικὸν τελοῦσιν ἐκκλησίας καὶ δικαστηρίων μετέδωκε μόνον). See, moreover, Arist. Pol. 
1273b35 - 1274a5 (Σόλωνα δ᾽ ἔνιοι μὲν οἴονται νομοθέτην γενέσθαι σπουδαῖον: ὀλιγαρχίαν 
τε γὰρ καταλῦσαι λίαν ἄκρατον οὖσαν, καὶ δουλεύοντα τὸν δῆμον παῦσαι, καὶ δημοκρατίαν 
καταστῆσαι τὴν πάτριον, μείξαντα καλῶς τὴν πολιτείαν: εἶναι γὰρ τὴν μὲν ἐν Ἀρείῳ πάγῳ 
βουλὴν ὀλιγαρχικόν, τὸ δὲ τὰς ἀρχὰς αἱρετὰς ἀριστοκρατικόν, τὰ δὲ δικαστήρια δημοτικόν. 
ἔοικε δὲ Σόλων ἐκεῖνα μὲν ὑπάρχοντα πρότερον οὐ καταλῦσαι, τήν τε βουλὴν καὶ τὴν 
τῶν ἀρχῶν αἵρεσιν, τὸν δὲ δῆμον καταστῆσαι, τὰ δικαστήρια ποιήσας ἐκ πάντων). In this 
passage, the lawgiver is said both to have preserved the existing bodies, and to have founded 
the ‘ancestral democracy’ (rather than the ‘popular court’ itself) by opening the existing 
δικαστήρια (that is, plausibly, the articulations of the same institution, i.e. the ἡλιαία) to 
everybody (rather than creating ex novo the δικαστήρια): cf. Rhodes (2006: 255, nt. 60). On 
the importance of the judicial functions ascribed to the Athenian people by Solon, see Maffi 
(2004: 305-306); Mirhady (2006: 4); Loddo (2015: 99).
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the ἔφεσις-remedy. The following paragraphs will deal with the ἀποδοκιμασία of the 
nine ἄρχοντες (§ 6), with the extraordinary and ordinary ἀποψηφίσεις of Athenian 
citizens (§ 7), and with the γνῶσις of arbitrators (§ 8). Finally, on the grounds of 
the data analyzed in this article, some speculative conclusions on the legal nature of 
ἔφεσις εἰς τὸ δικαστήριον – as far as the Solonian era is concerned – will be proposed 
(§ 9).
6) The ἀποδοκιμασία of the nine ἄρχοντες. 
The main sources for the δοκιμασία (that is the ‘vetting’) of the nine ἄρχοντες 
(or, better, ‘elected candidates to the nine magistracies’)10 are Ath. Pol. 45.3 and Ath. 
Pol. 55.2,11 together with Dem. 20.90.12 If I am not wrong, the following picture 
emerges from these three passages. 
During a first phase (that is before the reform of the rules in force), if the elected 
ἄρχων (who had to undergo a scrutiny before the Council) was rejected, the procedure 
stopped and the citizen who failed the δοκιμασία was not entitled to file an action 
against the negative vote at all. On the contrary, if he passed this first scrutiny at the 
vote of the Council, he was examined once more before the popular court. 
Sometime later a change in the previous arrangement occurred. During a second 
phase those who did not pass the first scrutiny of the Council exercised their own 
right to be ‘newly judged’ before the Athenian people by submitting ἔφεσις. The 
popular decision that – in practice – could either confirm or deny the vote of the 
Council was final. In the case of a positive vote at the scrutiny the procedure did 
not change. If this reading is exact, Demosthenes’ interpretation is confirmed. It 
is correct to maintain that the θεσμοθέται (as well as any other major magistrate), 
once elected, were to pass a double δοκιμασία in order to enter office. This statement, 
directly confirmed by Ath. Pol. 55.2, is not inconsistent with the rules given at Ath. 
Pol. 45.3. 
As a result, on the basis of these sources: 1. ἔφεσις is not a mandatory transfer, 
but a remedy to be used only by the rejected citizen against the vote of the Council (as 
10  Cf. Feyel (2009: 25-27, 148-197, 171-181, 363-370).
11  Ath. Pol. 45.3: δοκιμάζει δὲ καὶ τοὺς βουλευτὰς τοὺς τὸν ὕστερον ἐνιαυτὸν βουλεύσοντας 
καὶ τοὺς ἐννέα ἄρχοντας. καὶ πρότερον μὲν ἦν ἀποδοκιμάσαι κυρία, νῦν δὲ τούτοις ἔφεσίς 
ἐστιν εἰς τὸ δικαστήριον; Ath. Pol. 55.2: δοκιμάζονται δ᾽ οὗτοι πρῶτον μὲν ἐν τῇ βουλῇ τοῖς 
φ’, πλὴν τοῦ γραμματέως, οὗτος δ᾽ ἐν δικαστηρίῳ μόνον ὥσπερ οἱ ἄλλοι ἄρχοντες πάντες γὰρ 
καὶ οἱ κληρωτοὶ καὶ οἱ χειροτονητοὶ δοκιμασθέντες ἄρχουσιν, οἱ δ᾽ ἐννέα ἄρχοντες ἔν τε τῇ 
βουλῇ καὶ πάλιν ἐν δικαστηρίῳ. καὶ πρότερον μὲν οὐκ ἦρχεν ὅντιν᾽ ἀποδοκιμάσειεν ἡ βουλή, 
νῦν δ᾽ ἔφεσίς ἐστιν εἰς τὸ δικαστήριον, καὶ τοῦτο κύριόν ἐστι τῆς δοκιμασίας. On the temporal 
scanning of the amendments of the rules at issue, cf. Wilamowitz-Moellendorff (1893: 2.189); 
Hignett (1952: 205); Rhodes (1972: 176-178, 205, 316, 538); Rhodes (1981: 616-617); Lepri 
Sorge (1987: 432-433).
12  Dem. 20.90: τοὺς μὲν θεσμοθέτας τοὺς ἐπὶ τοὺς νόμους κληρουμένους δὶς δοκιμασθέντας 
ἄρχειν, ἔν τε τῇ βουλῇ καὶ παρ᾽ ὑμῖν ἐν τῷ δικαστηρίῳ.
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one can infer by considering the presence of the dative τούτοις and the persistent link 
existing between ἔφεσις and the verb ἀποδοκιμάζειν only); 2. the scrutiny before 
the people was a completely new one (which means that the popular court neither 
quashes, nor amends, nor approves a decision of ‘first instance’); 3. the candidate 
must be evaluated ex novo, this implying that a new procedure – rather than the 
second instance of the same procedure – is commenced before the popular court; 4. 
the rejected ἄρχων does not play the role of appellant before the people; again, he is 
a ‘candidate under scrutiny’ before the people.
7) Extraordinary and ordinary ἀποψηφίσεις. 
In 346/5 B.C., in order to remedy suspected infractions, the Athenians passed 
the proposal of Demophilus. It stipulated a general ‘scrutiny of the adult citizens’, 
referred to as a διαψήφισις τῶν ἐγγεγραμμένων τοῖς ληξιαρχικοῖς γραμματείοις.13 If 
the demesmen voted under oath against a scrutinized citizen, the latter, once ‘rejec-
ted by vote’ (ἀποψηφισθείς), was entitled to submit ἔφεσις in the view of a popular 
judgment. If the popular court rejected the ἀποψηφισθείς, he had de facto to leave 
the city: if he lost, he was sold into slavery. If, on the other hand, the vote did not go 
against him, he remained a citizen (πολίτης) recorded on the deme’s register. Our 
information about this special procedure mainly comes from Demosthenes’ speech 
Against Eubulides. In this case, Euxitheus contends that he was unjustly deprived 
of his citizenship as a result of the maneuverings of one of his enemies, Eubulides 
(who happened to be either the demarch or the mere representative of the deme of 
Halimous). This source provides a considerable amount of data dealing with the legal 
effects of ἔφεσις. 
At first, the final removal from the deme’s register (ἐξαλείφεσθαι) is the result of 
the deme’s ἀποψήφισις and, at the same time, the consent of the ἀποψηφισθείς.14 In 
other words the vote of the deme (which substantially consists of an ‘administrative 
act’, whereas it formally resembles a ‘ judicial pronouncement’) is not legally valid if 
the citizen does not ἐμμένειν (i.e. ‘to abide by, to stand by, to be true to’, or – that is 
to say – ‘to agree, to accept’).15 Accordingly, the relationship between the mere citizen 
and the ‘administrative body’, resembling the relationship between two ‘parithetic 
parties’ based on their agreement, turns out to be completely different from our 
13  On the διαψηφίσεις, cf. Whitehead (1986: 99-109); Feyel 2009 (143-148).
14  Liban. hypoth. Dem. 57: Γράφεται νόμος παρ’ Ἀθηναίοις γενέσθαι ζήτησιν πάντων τῶν 
ἐγγεγραμμένων τοῖς ληξιαρχικοῖς γραμματείοις εἴτε γνήσιοι πολῖταί εἰσιν εἴτε μή, τοὺς δὲ μὴ 
γεγονότας ἐξ ἀστοῦ καὶ ἐξ ἀστῆς ἐξαλείφεσθαι, διαψηφίζεσθαι δὲ περὶ πάντων τοὺς δημότας, 
καὶ τοὺς μὲν ἀποψηφισθέντας καὶ ἐμμείναντας τῇ ψήφῳ τῶν δημοτῶν ἐξαληλίφθαι καὶ 
εἶναι μετοίκους, τοῖς δὲ βουλομένοις ἔφεσιν εἰς δικαστὰς δεδόσθαι, κἂν μὲν ἁλῶσι καὶ παρὰ 
τῷ δικαστηρίῳ, πεπρᾶσθαι, ἐὰν δὲ ἀποφύγωσιν, εἶναι πολίτας; cf., moreover, Dem. 57.12: 
… καὶ ὅ τι γνοίησαν περὶ ἐμοῦ, τούτοις ἤθελον ἐμμένειν. The source is reliable: cf. Rhodes 
(1981: 502) and Harris (2013: 76 and nt. 52), pace MacDowell (2009: 288).
15  Cf. LSJ s.v. ἐμμένω.
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conceptions in which any ‘authority’ vested with administrative functions is hierar-
chically superior and entitled to exercise iure imperii a power conferred by public law.
Secondly, since the ἐφιείς plays the role of κατεγορούμενος before the popular 
court, he is definitely not a real appellant.16 As a result, the ἔφεσις, as an act filed by 
the dissatisfied ἀποψηφισθείς, results in a ‘denial of consent’ rather than in a ‘claim’ 
or in ‘means tending to commence a procedure of second instance’. In other words, if 
an ἔφεσις is submitted, the demesmen are the only party interested in a new scrutiny, 
as well as in a popular vote on the same matter. They would therefore start a new 
procedure only if they remain convinced that the ἀποψηφισθείς must be removed 
from the register, without being compelled to file the case before the popular court. 
Since a super-individual interest is concerned, it is up to the administrative body to 
continue the procedure. Otherwise, given that the ἀποψηφισθείς does not ἐμμένειν, 
no change occurs. The final removal of the registered citizen cannot take place. 
Mutatis mutandis, Ath. Pol. 42.1 confirms the previous legal framework.17 This 
passage describes the ordinary ‘scrutiny for citizenship’ (or, better to say, the ordinary 
‘δοκιμασία to become ephebes’).18 The demesmen, acting like judges, voted on the 
candidates, assessing whether they were the right age and whether they were free and 
born according to the laws. If a candidate passed, he was immediately recorded. If he 
did not pass, he could submit ἔφεσις. Once the ἔφεσις is submitted, the demesmen 
must start the proceedings before the people. This case, in fact, involves a particular 
interest which it is impossible to satisfy without the ‘public cooperation’. Ath. Pol. 
42.1 (along with Dem. 57) provides the following information. If ἔφεσις is submitted 
by a rejected candidate, the decision of the deme (here consisting of a ‘denial of 
registration’, and not of a ‘removal from the register’) is not completed since an 
essential requirement is missing, i.e. the scrutinized young adult’s consent. If ἔφεσις 
16  Dem. 57.1: πολλὰ καὶ ψευδῆ κατηγορηκότος ἡμῶν Εὐβουλίδου, καὶ βλασφημίας οὔτε 
προσηκούσας οὔτε δικαίας πεποιημένου, πειράσομαι τἀληθῆ καὶ τὰ δίκαια λέγων, ὦ ἄνδρες 
δικασταί, δεῖξαι καὶ μετὸν τῆς πόλεως ἡμῖν καὶ πεπονθότ᾽ ἐμαυτὸν οὐχὶ προσήκονθ᾽ ὑπὸ 
τούτου; Dem. 57.1: ἐπειδὴ τοίνυν οὗτος εἰδὼς τοὺς νόμους καὶ μᾶλλον ἢ προσῆκεν, ἀδίκως 
καὶ πλεονεκτικῶς τὴν κατηγορίαν πεποίηται, ἀναγκαῖον ἐμοὶ περὶ ὧν ἐν τοῖς δημόταις 
ὑβρίσθην πρῶτον εἰπεῖν; Dem. 57.17: νῦν δὲ τί δίκαιον νομίζω καὶ τί παρεσκεύασμαι ποιεῖν, 
ἄνδρες δικασταί; δεῖξαι πρὸς ὑμᾶς ἐμαυτὸν Ἀθηναῖον ὄντα καὶ τὰ πρὸς πατρὸς καὶ τὰ πρὸς 
μητρός, καὶ μάρτυρας τούτων, οὓς ὑμεῖς ἀληθεῖς φήσετ᾽ εἶναι, παρασχέσθαι, τὰς δὲ λοιδορίας 
καὶ τὰς αἰτίας ἀνελεῖν; Liban. hypoth. Dem. 57: … ἐὰν δὲ ἀποφύγωσιν.
17  Ath. Pol. 42.1: μετέχουσιν μὲν τῆς πολιτείας οἱ ἐξ ἀμφοτέρων γεγονότες ἀστῶν, 
ἐγγράφονται δ᾽ εἰς τοὺς δημότας ὀκτωκαίδεκα ἔτη γεγονότες. ὅταν δ᾽ ἐγγράφωνται, 
διαψηφίζονται περὶ αὐτῶν ὀμόσαντες οἱ δημόται, πρῶτον μὲν εἰ δοκοῦσι γεγονέναι 
τὴν ἡλικίαν τὴν ἐκ τοῦ νόμου, κἂν μὴ δόξωσι, ἀπέρχονται πάλιν εἰς παῖδας, δεύτερον δ᾽ 
εἰ ἐλεύθερός ἐστι καὶ γέγονε κατὰ τοὺς νόμους. ἔπειτ᾽ ἂν μὲν ἀποψηφίσωνται μὴ εἶναι 
ἐλεύθερον, ὁ μὲν ἐφίησιν εἰς τὸ δικαστήριον, οἱ δὲ δημόται κατηγόρους αἱροῦνται πέντε 
ἄνδρας ἐξ αὑτῶν, κἂν μὲν μὴ δόξῃ δικαίως ἐγγράφεσθαι, πωλεῖ τοῦτον ἡ πόλις: ἐὰν δὲ 
νικήσῃ, τοῖς δημόταις ἐπάναγκες ἐγγράφειν.
18  Cf. Pélékidis (1962: 86-89); Scafuro (1994); Lape (2000: 191-198); Robertson (2000).
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is submitted (if the young adult, interested in the record of his own name in the deme 
register, does not ἐμμένειν – abide by – the ‘denial of registration’), the demesmen, 
in order to overcome the resulting stalemate, are to proceed by selecting the accusers, 
and by starting a new scrutiny-procedure before the people. Since the ἐφιείς plays 
the role of κατεγορούμενος (accused/defendant) before the popular court, he does 
not file any appeal neither in form, nor in substance.
On the contrary, Is. 12 shows a different and exceptional example of application 
of ἔφεσις19. In my opinion these are the facts. 
Euphiletus, once removed from his deme’s register, started a legal action for 
damages before the public arbitrators. The particular legal proceedings may make 
sense if one assumes that the demotic scrutiny takes place before the proposal of 
Demophilus is passed. Accordingly, as far as this time-phase is concerned, the citizen’s 
consent is not an essential requirement for the removal from the registry and ἔφεσις 
cannot be submitted. The citizen suffering damages for an unjust removal is allowed 
to bring a δίκη βλάβης against the demesmen: this is the only procedural remedy 
provided by the Athenian legislator. After two years, Euphiletus wins the case.20 It 
is only then that he submits an ἔφεσις to the people (conceivably by supporting an 
extensive use of the remedy, after the Athenians passed the proposal of Demophilus) 
and, therefore, sues the demesmen before the people21. 
In other words, in this case, the ἐφιείς formally plays the role of διώκων before 
the popular court. He indeed attacks an already existing, enforceable and binding 
‘administrative act of removal’. On the contrary, in Dem. 57 as well as is Ath. Pol. 42.1, 
in order to surpass the stalemate, the demesmen are to start a new legal procedure 
before the popular court, and only if they obtain a favorable popular judgment, the 
negative effects produced by the ἔφεσις are overridden. Yet, the dispute shows, from 
a substantive point of view, a dialectical structure in which the demesmen act as 
19  Cf., for a short introduction to the speech (and for its Italian translation), Cobetto 
Ghiggia (2012: 468-479); for different interpretations of the case, see Wyse (1904); Bonner 
(1907: 416-418), Ralph (1936=1941: 42); Paoli (1950); Just (1968); Hansen (1976: 64, nt. 26); 
Rhodes (1981: 500); Carey (1997: 213-216); Kapparis (2005).
20  Is. 12.11: ἔλαχεν ὁ Εὐφίλητος τὴν δίκην τὴν προτέραν τῷ κοινῷ τῶν δημοτῶν καὶ 
τῷ τότε δημαρχοῦντι, ὃς νῦν τετελεύτηκε, δύο ἔτη τοῦ διαιτητοῦ τὴν δίαιταν ἔχοντος; Is. 
12.11: τοῖς δὲ διαιτῶσι μέγιστα <ταῦτα> σημεῖα ἦν τοῦ ψεύδεσθαι τούτους, καὶ κατεδιῄτησαν 
αὐτῶν ἀμφότεροι; Is. 12.12: ὡς μὲν τοίνυν καὶ τότε ὦφλον τὴν δίαιταν, ἀκηκόατε.
21  Dion. Hal. Is. 14.19-20: ἡ ὑπὲρ Εὐφιλήτου πρὸς τὸν Ἐρχιέων δῆμον ἔφεσις; Dion. 
Hal. Is. 16.25-37: ποιήσω καὶ τοῦτο, προχειρισάμενος τὸν ὑπὲρ Εὐφιλήτου λόγον, ἐν ᾧ τὸν 
Ἐρχιέων δῆμον εἰς τὸ δικαστήριον προσκαλεῖταί τις τῶν ἀποψηφισθέντων ὡς ἀδίκως τῆς 
πολιτείας ἀπελαυνόμενος. ἐγράφη γὰρ δή τις ὑπὸ τῶν Ἀθηναίων νόμος ἐξέτασιν γενέσθαι 
τῶν πολιτῶν κατὰ δήμους, τὸν δὲ ἀποψηφισθέντα ὑπὸ τῶν δημοτῶν τῆς πολιτείας μετέχειν, 
τοῖς δὲ ἀδίκως ἀποψηφισθεῖσιν ἔφεσιν εἰς τὸ δικαστήριον εἶναι, προσκαλεσαμένeοις 
τοὺς δημότας, καὶ ἐὰν τὸ δεύτερον ἐξελεγχθῶσι, πεπρᾶσθαι αὐτοὺς καὶ τὰ χρήματα εἶναι 
δημόσια. κατὰ τοῦτον τὸν νόμον ὁ Εὐφίλητος προσκαλεσάμενος τοὺς Ἐρχιέας ὡς ἀδίκως 
καταψηφισαμένους αὐτοῦ τὸν ἀγῶνα τόνδε διατίθεται.
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κατήγοροι, whereas the ἐφιείς-προσκαλεσάμενος acts as a κατεγορούμενος.22 This 
use of the ἔφεσις, once compared with the other cases, is revealed to be a fundamental 
precondition for the legal procedure before the people, rather than a kind of ‘statement 
of claim’ initiating the legal procedure before the people.
8) The arbitral γνῶσις. 
As it is well recognized by the current communis opinio, during the fourth century 
the majority of δίκαι (in accordance with the principle of ‘residuality’) fell under the 
jurisdiction of the Forty. For private legal actions involving more than ten drachmai, 
these magistrates – obviously after a first summary decision at least concerned with 
the value of the matter at issue – referred the case to a board of public arbitrators. 
A stage of the procedure which partially resembled the ἀνάκρισις took place before 
them (even though evidence was not just presented, but also examined; the arbitrators 
made an attempt at conciliation; the δίκη was susceptible to end if the arbitrators, with 
the agreement of the disputants, passed a final decision).23 Since the claimant and the 
defendant had to express their agreement about the substance of the γνῶσις suggested 
by the public arbitrators, such a decision cannot be easily defined as a ‘binding award’, 
or as a proper ‘ judgment’. It rather looks like a proposal submitted to the disputants.24 
If that is true, with regard to the legal procedure before public arbitrators, ἔφεσις 
is neither an appeal, nor a mandatory transfer. Aristotle, along with Demosthenes, 
presents it as ‘the denial of consent’ expressed by either party (if not by both parties), 
which is a ‘negative requirement’ of the binding force of the decision of the arbitrator.25
22  Is. 12.8: εἶτα, ὦ ἄνδρες δικασταί, εἰ μὲν οὗτοι ἐκινδύνευον, ἠξίουν ἂν τοῖς αὑτῶν οἰκείοις 
ὑμᾶς πιστεύειν μαρτυροῦσι μᾶλλον ἢ τοῖς κατηγόροις.
23  Harrison (1971: 66-68, 73-74); MacDowell (1971); Biscardi (1982: 264); Todd (1993: 128-
129); Scafuro (1997: 35-37, 383-391). On the features of ἀνάκρισις, see Harris (2013: 210-213).
24  Steinwenter (1925=1971: 71); Wolff (1946: 79); Thür (2008: 56).
25  Cf. Ath. Pol. 53.2: οἱ δὲ παραλαβόντες, ἐὰν μὴ δύνωνται διαλῦσαι, γιγνώσκουσι, κἂν 
μὲν ἀμφοτέροις ἀρέσκῃ τὰ γνωσθέντα καὶ ἐμμένωσιν, ἔχει τέλος ἡ δίκη. ἂν δ᾽ ὁ ἕτερος 
ἐφῇ τῶν ἀντιδίκων εἰς τὸ δικαστήριον, ἐμβαλόντες τὰς μαρτυρίας καὶ τὰς προκλήσεις καὶ 
τοὺς νόμους εἰς ἐχίνους, χωρὶς μὲν τὰς τοῦ διώκοντος, χωρὶς δὲ τὰς τοῦ φεύγοντος, καὶ 
τούτους κατασημηνάμενοι, καὶ τὴν γνῶσιν τοῦ διαιτητοῦ γεγραμμένην ἐν γραμματείῳ 
προσαρτήσαντες, παραδιδόασι τοῖς δ# τοῖς τὴν φυλὴν τοῦ φεύγοντος δικάζουσιν; Dem. 23.59: 
οἱ δικασταὶ δ᾽ ἀκούσαντες, εἰς οὓς ἐφῆκεν, ταὐτὰ καὶ τοῖς τούτου φίλοις καὶ τῷ διαιτητῇ 
περὶ αὐτῶν ἔγνωσαν καὶ δέκα ταλάντων ἐτίμησαν; Dem. 40.17: καὶ οὗτος συνειδὼς αὑτῷ 
ἀδίκως ἐγκαλοῦντι οὔτε ἐφῆκεν εἰς τὸ δικαστήριον, οὔτε νῦν περὶ ἐκείνων εἴληχέ μοι δίκην 
οὐδεμίαν; Dem. 40.31: ἔτι δὲ πάντες ὑμῖν οἱ πρὸς τῷ διαιτητῇ παρόντες μεμαρτυρήκασιν ὡς 
οὗτος παρὼν αὐτός, ὅτε ἀπεδιῄτησέ μου ὁ διαιτητής, οὔτε ἐφῆκεν εἰς τὸ δικαστήριον ἐνέμεινέ 
τε τῇ διαίτῃ. καίτοι ἄτοπον δοκεῖ μοι εἶναι, εἰ οἱ μὲν ἄλλοι, ὅταν οἴωνται ἀδικεῖσθαι, καὶ τὰς 
πάνυ μικρὰς δίκας εἰς ὑμᾶς ἐφιᾶσιν, οὗτος δέ μοι περὶ προικὸς δίκην ταλάντου λαχών, ταύτης, 
ὡς αὐτός φησιν, ἀδίκως ἀποδιαιτηθείσης ἐνέμεινεν; Dem. 40.55: τούτοις δ ,᾽ εἰ φασὶν ἀδίκως 
ἀποδιαιτῆσαί μου τὸν διαιτητὴν τὰς δίκας, καὶ τότ᾽ ἐξῆν εἰς ὑμᾶς ἐφεῖναι καὶ νῦν ἐγγενήσεται 
πάλιν, ἐὰν βούλωνται, παρ᾽ ἐμοῦ λαβεῖν ἐν ὑμῖν τὸ δίκαιον.
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Obviously, if the claimant was dissatisfied by the proposal of the arbitrator, after 
submitting the ἔφεσις he had an actual interest in obtaining a binding and final 
judgment ‘on the same matter’26 passed by the popular court. Οn the other hand, if 
the dissatisfied defendant submitted the ἔφεσις and, accordingly, nullified de facto 
the decision of the arbitrators, he clearly had no interest in having the case heard 
again before a popular court. In other words, after the submission of the ἔφεσις, 
the claimant was the only litigant interested in starting a new procedure before the 
people and, thence, in a new popular judgment (whether he was the ἐφιείς or not). 
For such reasons, the case disputed before the arbiter – perhaps due to practice – was 
referred to the popular court by means of the competent magistrates.27 This can be 
inferred from a literal interpretation of Ath.Pol.: the passage under consideration 
suggests taking the indicative present tense ‘παραδιδόασι’ (the subject of which in 
my opinion is ‘the parties’ and not the arbiters or the magistrates) on deontic value. 
Despite this, ἔφεσις is completely different from a magisterial εἰσαγωγή and 
from a true appeal. It stands for ‘absence of ἐμμένειν’ (‘the absence of consent’) and, 
as a negative requirement, it prevents a final and binding award. It provokes the 
referral, but it cannot be identified with the latter itself (so that, in such cases, the 
devolutive effect is just an indirect and passing one). It is not a magisterial act (but, 
clearly, an act of a disputant). It is not a mandatory act (since its submission takes 
place only according with one party’s will).
9. Some conclusions on the legal nature of the Solonian reform.
If one is allowed to extend to the original ἔφεσις the traits characterizing the 
more recent applications of this procedural institution, the following legal figure, 
though conjecturally, emerges. The Solonian ἔφεσις:
- is an ‘act of any dissatisfied citizen’ affected by a formal ‘authoritative decision’ 
pronounced by a magistrate (as well as by a public body or by an arbitrator, in later 
times); 28
26  Lex. Seg. s.v. ἔφεσις: εἴσοδος ἡ εἰς ἄλλο δικαστήριον ἐφιεμένη ὑπὲρ τοῦ κριθῆναι αὖθις 
τὸ αὐτὸ πρᾶγμα.
27  This practice may be considered the ground for several lexicographic definitions: they seem 
to confuse the effect with the cause (probably influenced by the Hellenistic ἔκκλητος δίκη, a 
legal procedure which ended up overlapping with ἔφεσις: cf. Cataldi [1979]): Harp. s.v. ἔφεσις: 
ἡ ἐξ ἑτέρου δικαστηρίου εἰς ἕτερον μεταγωγή· τὸ δὲ αὐτὸ καὶ ἔκκλητος καλεῖται; Diogen. s.v. 
ἔφεσις: ἡ ἀπὸ τοῦ δικαστηρίου εἰς ἕτερον δικαστήριον μετάβασις; Etym. Mag. s.v. ἔφεσις: Ἡ ἐκ 
δικαστηρίου οἱουδήποτε ἐφ’ ἕτερον δικαστήριον μεταγωγή· ἡ εἰς ἄλλο δικαστήριον ἐφιεμένη 
δίκη ὑπὲρ τοῦ κριθῆναι πάλιν (cf., moreover, Lex. Simeonis); Lex. Seg. s.v. ἔφεσις: εἴσοδος ἡ εἰς 
ἄλλο δικαστήριον ἐφιεμένη ὑπὲρ τοῦ κριθῆναι αὖθις τὸ αὐτὸ πρᾶγμα; Lex Byz. Jur.: Ἔφεσις 
λέγεται ἡ ἔκκλητος; Suda s.v. ἔφεσις: ἡ ἐξ ἑτέρου δικαστηρίου εἰς ἕτερον μεταγωγή. τὸ δὲ αὐτὸ 
καὶ ἔκκλητος καλεῖται. τὸ οὖν ἔφεσις ἀπὸ τοῦ ἐφεῖναι ῥήματος.
28  Cf. Ath. Pol. 53.2; Dem. 40.17; Dem. 40.31; Dem. 40.55. See, moreover, Ath. Pol. 45.1-
2: ὁ δὲ δῆμος ἀφείλετο τῆς βουλῆς τὸ θανατοῦν καὶ δεῖν καὶ χρήμασι ζημιοῦν, καὶ νόμον 
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- is a ‘negative requirement’, that prevents the binding force and the enforceability 
of the ‘authoritative decision’ (which is not necessarily a ‘ judicial ruling’ only, but can 
also be an ‘administrative and coercive measure’);
- is a ‘pre-condition of the popular procedure’; by blocking the previous decision, 
it does not introduce, from a strict procedural point of view, a ‘revisio prioris instan-
tiae’ or a ‘prosecutio prioris instantiae’;
ἔθετο, ἄν τινος ἀδικεῖν ἡ βουλὴ καταγνῷ ἢ ζημιώσῃ, τὰς καταγνώσεις καὶ τὰς ἐπιζημιώσεις 
εἰσάγειν τοὺς θεσμοθέτας εἰς τὸ δικαστήριον, καὶ ὅ τι ἂν οἱ δικασταὶ ψηφίσωνται, 
τοῦτο κύριον εἶναι. κρίνει δὲ τὰς ἀρχὰς ἡ βουλὴ τὰς πλείστας, καὶ μάλισθ᾽ ὅσαι χρήματα 
διαχειρίζουσιν: οὐ κυρία δ᾽ ἡ κρίσις, ἀλλ᾽ ἐφέσιμος εἰς τὸ δικαστήριον. ἔξεστι δὲ καὶ τοῖς 
ἰδιώταις εἰσαγγέλλειν ἣν ἂν βούλωνται τῶν ἀρχῶν μὴ χρῆσθαι τοῖς νόμοις: ἔφεσις δὲ καὶ 
τούτοις ἐστὶν εἰς τὸ δικαστήριον, ἐὰν αὐτῶν ἡ βουλὴ καταγνῷ (according to Lipsius [1905-
1915: 198], if the Council voted against the denounced magistrate and condemned him to 
a fine within the τέλος of five-hundred drachmai, he was allowed to ‘appeal’ to the people; 
contra, cf. Bonner - Smith [1930-1938: 2.240-243], who believe that the verb εἰσάγειν and 
the noun ἔφεσις overlap and imply only a mandatory transfer when a fine exceeding five-
hundred drachmai is at stake). On the contrary, Dem. 34.21, quoted by Ruschenbusch (1961: 
389), is not relevant, if one reads ἀφῆκεν (cf., in this sense, Wade-Gery [1958: 193, nt. 4]). 
For ἔφεσις as a voluntary act of the dissatisfied party, even the following inscriptions are 
relevant. Cf. IG II2 1128, 20 (regulations passed by Karthaia, Koresos and Ioulis on Kea 
in response to Athenian decrees concerning the export of ruddle), where the procedural 
remedy at issue is submitted by the dissatisfied accuser after a simple vote by the officials (and 
not as ‘cause of replacement-procedure for the initial decision’): τὴν δὲ ἔνδειξιν εἶν]- // αι 
πρὸς τοὺς ἀστυνόμους, τοὺς δὲ ἀστυνόμους δοῦνα[ι τὴν ψῆφον περὶ αὐτῆς τριάκοντα ἡ]- // 
μερῶν εἰς τὸ δικαστήριον· τῶι δὲ φήναντι ἢ ἐνδείξαντ[ι (…) // (…) τῶν ἡμι]- // σ[έ]ων· ἐὰν δὲ 
δοῦλος ἦι ὁ ἐνδείξας, ἐὰμ μὲν τῶν ἐξαγόν[των ἦι, ἐλεύθερος // ἔστω καὶ τὰ τρ]- // [ί]α μέρη 
ἔστω αὐτῶι· ἐὰν δὲ ἄλλου τινὸς ἦι, ἐλεύθερος ἔστ[ω καὶ (…) // (…) εἶν]- // αι [δὲ] καὶ ἔφεσιν 
Ἀθήναζε καὶ τῶι φήναντι καὶ τῶι ἐνδεί[ξαντι (cf., moreover, IG II2 111,49; IG II2 404, 17; IG 
II2 179, 14); IG II2 1183, 20-21 (regulation of the Deme of Hagnous concerning the duties of 
the demarch), where it is stipulated that, if the ten elected men condemn the demarch who 
is undergoing the euthynai-procedure, the latter is allowed to submit the decision to a vote 
by all the demesmen: τὴν δὲ ψῆφον διδότω [ὁ ν]-[έ]ος δήμαρχος καὶ ἐξορκού[τ]ω αὐτοὺς 
ἐναντίον τῶν δημο[τῶ]- // [ν]· εἶναι δὲ καὶ ἔφεσιν αὐτῶι [ε]ἰς ἅπαντ̣ας τοὺς δημότας· ἐ[ὰν] 
// [δ]έ τις ἐφῆι, ἐξορκούτω ὁ δήμα[ρ]χος τοὺ<ς> δημότας καὶ διδό[τω] // [τ]ὴν ψῆφον ἐὰν 
παρῶσιν μὴ ̣ ἐλάττους ἢ ∶ΔΔΔ∶ ἐὰν δὲ καταψη[̣φίζ]- // ωνται αὐτοῦ̣ οἱ δημόται, ὀφειλέτω τὸ 
ἡμιόλιον ὅσου ἂν [τιμ]- // ηθεῖ αὐτῶι ὑπὸ τῶν δέκα τῶν αἱρ[ε]θέντων; IG II2 1237, 29-40 
(Athenian phratry decrees of Dekelea), where a provision allows anyone who is rejected by the 
phratry to submit ἔφεσις and, accordingly, to undergo a re-trial before the Demotionidai: ἐ- // 
ὰν δέ τις βόληται ἐφεῖναι ἐς Δημοτιων- // ίδας ὧν ἂν ἀποψηφίσωνται, ἐξεῖναι αὐ- // τῶι· 
ἑλέσθαι δὲ ἐπ’ αὐτοῖς συνηγόρος τ- // ὸν Δεκελειῶν οἶκον πέντε ἄνδρας ὑπὲ- // ρ τριάκοντα 
ἔτη γεγονότας, τούτος δὲ // ἐξορκωσάτω ὁ φρατρίαρχος καὶ ὁ ἱερε- // ὺς συνηγορήσεν τὰ 
δικαιότατα καὶ ὀκ // ἐάσεν ὀδένα μὴ ὄντα φράτερα φρατρίζ- // εν. ὅτο δ’ ἂν τῶν ἐφέντων 
ἀποψηφίσωντα- // ι Δημοτιωνίδαι, ὀφειλέτω χιλίας δρα- // χμὰς ἱερὰς τῶι Διὶ τῶι Φρατρίωι. 
Against my view, IG I3 40 [= ML 52], 70 (amendment to the Athenian decree laying down 
rules for the people of Khalkis in Euboia; cf. Maffi [1984]; Dreher [2006]) is not decisive, 
since the legal terminology used in the inscription is quite imprecise. I would like to thank 
Edward Harris for pointing out these passages to me. 
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- brings about a new legal procedure before the people, without being neither a 
proper ‘statement of claim’ at first instance, nor a formal ‘appeal’ from a lower judge 
to a higher one;
- produces negative effects on the (proposed) ‘authoritative decision’. This also 
means that the legal procedure before the popular court is a new one on the same 
matter and between the same parties playing the same role (παλινδικία), as well 
as that the popular ruling (by declaring the ἔφεσις founded or unfounded) neither 
quashes, nor amends, nor confirms the decision challenged by the ἐφιείς, but 
constitutes a final judgment given for the first time;
- is a ‘denial of consent’ which means that, from Solon on, the ‘agreement’ is 
conceived of as an essential element for any ‘official act’ both substantially determined 
by a public authority (different from the people) and directly affecting one member 
of the people29.
29  If this is true (i.e. if after Solon passed his procedural reform on ἔφεσις the ‘agreement of 
the parties’ was an ‘essential element’ for a final decision), on the basis of a well known passage 
from the corpus Demosthenicum, i.e. Dem. 43.75, one could suggest some further ‘speculative 
considerations’ (rather than ‘historically grounded considerations’, as Edward Harris per 
epistulam has pointed out to me, given that the document at issue is probably a forgery): ὁ 
ἄρχων ἐπιμελείσθω τῶν ὀρφανῶν καὶ τῶν ἐπικλήρων καὶ τῶν οἴκων τῶν ἐξερημουμένων 
καὶ τῶν γυναικῶν, ὅσαι μένουσιν ἐν τοῖς οἴκοις τῶν ἀνδρῶν τῶν τεθνηκότων φάσκουσαι 
κυεῖν. τούτων ἐπιμελείσθω καὶ μὴ ἐάτω ὑβρίζειν μηδένα περὶ τούτους. ἐὰν δέ τις ὑβρίζῃ 
ἢ ποιῇ τι παράνομον, κύριος ἔστω ἐπιβάλλειν κατὰ τὸ τέλος. ἐὰν δὲ μείζονος ζημίας δοκῇ 
ἄξιος εἶναι, προσκαλεσάμενος πρόπεμπτα καὶ τίμημα ἐπιγραψάμενος, ὅ τι ἂν δοκῇ αὐτῷ, 
εἰσαγέτω εἰς τὴν ἡλιαίαν. ἐὰν δ’ ἁλῷ, τιμάτω ἡ ἡλιαία περὶ τοῦ ἁλόντος, ὅ τι χρὴ αὐτὸν 
παθεῖν ἢ ἀποτεῖσαι (see, moreover, Ath. Pol. 56.7: ἐπιμελεῖται δὲ καὶ τῶν ὀρφανῶν καὶ τῶν 
ἐπικλήρων, καὶ τῶν γυναικῶν ὅσαι ἂν τελευτήσαντος τοῦ ἀνδρὸς σκήπτωνται κύειν. καὶ 
κύριός ἐστι τοῖς ἀδικοῦσιν ἐπιβάλλειν ἢ εἰσάγειν εἰς τὸ δικαστήριον). The νόμος stipulates 
that the ἄρχων – who had to take care of children without fathers, ἐπίκληρος, οἶκοι left 
destitute of heirs, and all pregnant women who remained in the οἶκοι of their deceased 
husbands – was entitled to prohibit ‘anyone’ (rather than only relatives or guardians) from 
committing ὕβρις to the protected individuals, as well as to punish the offender by giving 
a final decision, provided that the τέλος imposed by law was respected (i.e. the fine was 
imposed both ratione materiae, i.e. according to the ἄρχων’s competence, and within a 
given value-limit). It is noteworthy to highlight that such rules do not make any allusion to 
‘ἔφεσις to the popular court’. They just deal with a ‘magisterial referral’ in terms of εἰσάγειν. 
They describe an archaic procedure and show an example of prosecutorial discretion of the 
ἄρχων; no mention to ὁ βουλόμενος occurs. The name ἡλιαία does not prove the post-
Solonian origin of the rules. On these grounds, if one supposes that the νόμος reproduced 
in the document is (substantially) a Solonian one, but even repeating earlier provisions, 
the following diachronic shift appears (provided that the referral was always compulsory if 
the magistrate proposed penalties that were higher than a certain amount). Before Solon’s 
reforms (cf. Ath. Pol. 4.4), the person aggrieved was entitled to take a new legal action 
before the Areopagus, denouncing the violation perpetrated by the ἄρχων (if he infringes 
his own competence ratione materiae or goes beyond the given value-limit: cf., amplius, 
Pelloso [2014-2015]). Once Solon introduced ἔφεσις, even if the fine was within the legal 
45Ephesis eis to dikasterion
By the time of Solon, one could hardly qualify the ἔφεσις εἰς τὸ δικαστήριον as 
an ‘appeal to the people’; by the time of Solon, one could hardly qualify the ἔφεσις 
εἰς τὸ δικαστήριον as an ‘obligatory reference’; by the time of Solon, one – albeit 
tautologically – could qualify the ἔφεσις just as ἔφεσις.
τέλος (i.e. if the magistrate ‘proposed’, rather than ‘imposed’, a fine both according to his 
competence and within a given value-limit), the decision could anyway be ‘attacked’ for 
any abuse of power or any lack of power (cf., for the conjectural ‘Solonian kernel’ of the 
Demosthenic passage, Scafuro [2006]).
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